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INTRODUCTION 
The issue this article addresses is how to improve the intelligence product. That is, how to make it 
more acceptable to those who use it as an input to the policy and decision-making process. The most senior 
officials responsible for making policy determine, to a large extent, what the priorities are. They have the 
responsibility and the power to insure that resources are applied to answering their questions. Thus, the 
central principle of intelligence as practiced today in the United States is that the president is the most 
senior policy maker and therefore the most important consumer of the intelligence product. The chief 
executive asks the questions that get the highest priority. 
Intelligence is valuable to policy makers because it has the potential for supplying insights into 
international affairs that may be of great value to the policy makers. Crises are especially fruitful for the 
study and practice of intelligence because they narrow the problem space and enable many resources to be 
concentrated and coordinated in ways difficult to achieve otherwise. Whatever improvements in the 
intelligence product may be contemplated, they must accomplish two goals. First, they must make it more 
likely that crises will be anticipated. Second, they must indicate what changes would be required if a crisis 
rose up in the policy maker's path. 
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES 
The most written about intelligence product of the intelligence community (IC) is the National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE).1 Although many have studied NIEs, they have concentrated heavily on 
strategic nuclear matters, especially whether the estimate was correct or not and whose systematic bias 
turned out to be the correct one. Nearly everyone who has discussed NIEs has been critical of them.2 They 
are too often compilations of that which no one objected to, rather than pointed analysis of the likely course 
of events. In order to understand whether there is a genuine possibility of overcoming the flaws in the 
process that produces NIEs, one must look to the discipline of cognitive psychology to discover how the 
mind works at perceiving and organizing our knowledge of the world. A recent and comprehensive work 
dealing with the subject is Y.Y. Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, 
Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking.2, He is not optimistic.  He might have had 
NIEs in mind when in his conclusion he wrote: 
Whenever ambiguity and uncertainty are high, the definition of the situation is more likely to be 
a function of the person than the objective stimulus. When ambiguity and uncertainty increase, 
the information becomes more open to competitive interpretations and choosing among them 
becomes more complicated.4
Vertzberger's prescriptions are rather disappointing in the end, not to say Utopian. The first is 
"restricting the access of top political positions" to people with demonstrated competence using the panoply 
of modern decision-making techniques. He recognizes the unlikelihood of that. The other is to truly 
professionalize intelligence and other supporting bureaucracies to insure competency on their part, and to 
help constrain, educate, and enlighten political leaders who have achieved their positions by the exercise of 
their very different competency. It does seem that there are opportunities in the way NIEs are constructed 
and presented to make them more honest and directly useful to the people who must make decisions and 
establish policies in the face of uncertainty and risk. 
Before examining how this might be done it is necessary to note that any measure of improvement in 
the NIEs must be based on why NIEs exist. NIEs deal with the future and must be judged thereby. However, 
not in terms of correct prediction, but rather in terms of identifying and exposing the significant variables that 
will affect any outcome and presenting them in a way that is useful to the policy maker. If an NIE is being 
written in the context of a significant upcoming election, it would be nice if the estimate picked the winner(s) 
and a prediction undoubtedly would be advanced. But, the IC could do that no better than the local pollsters 
and pundits. The IC would provide some useful information on major issues and other parties and 
personalities as part of the explanation of the political context. But, they almost certainly would not have 
provided alternative scenarios in decreasing order of likelihood, given that the main prediction proved wrong, 
together with indicative events or signs that one or another possible outcome were becoming more or less 
likely. 
Improving the intelligence product, then, involves some analytical effort that is carried out on a 
consistent basis and that is treated as an essential part of the NIE production effort. The nearest approach by 
the IC to matching prediction against outcome has been the 'post-mortem,' usually conducted after a 
significant intelligence failure."1 Seldom, if ever, has a post-mortem been held to study success and never as 
a normal part of the process. But, it is essential that self-assessment and reinforcement of success be made a 
normal part of the process at the highest level. If it cannot be established over time that NIEs have antici-
pated the major causes of observed outcomes, even if the outcome that eventuated had been thought one of 
the less likely outcomes, then serious thought has to be given to the value of the enterprise at all. 
A CASE STUDY: THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 
To illustrate the argument made above, an intelligence estimate on the likelihood of war between Israel 
and its Arab neighbors in May 1967 will be reconstructed. The inferred estimate draws upon declassified 
information and is presented in an informal fashion that highlights what would be its main conclusions. This 
estimate will then be critiqued using contemporary open source information. On the basis of this critique 
several suggestions will be put forward for improving the form and content of NIEs as well as their 
evaluation. 
Israel 
• Since 1956, Israel has known that American support is conditional. Israeli leaders believe that the 
durable core of American interests in the region is access to oil for itself and the non-communist world 
and security for oil producers. Thus, Israeli leaders know that their interests will always be in a state 
of tension with the American desire for stable, friendly relations with most Arab states.6 
• The Israeli armed forces are superior to and can defeat any combination of Arab forces. Only the 
direct intervention of a major power, such as the USSR, could upset this superiority.7 
• The United States does not control Israeli policy, but it does have significant influence. Israel has been 
told in the most straightforward terms that the US will not commit itself to supporting Israel if it 
initiates hostilities or tries to change territorial borders. We believe, therefore, that Israel will consider 
its course very carefully.8 
• Israeli concerns about terrorist raids across its Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian borders are real. 
Beyond the casualties suffered, the raids are damaging to Israel psychologically while encouraging to 
Israel's enemies.9 
• The closing of the Straits of Tiran is unacceptable to Israel. Sooner or later Israel will fight for free 
access to the Gulf of Aqaba.10 
• Israel is capable of initiating major hostilities with little or no prior warning.11 
Egypt 
Egypt is determined to retain, if not strengthen, its positions as regional leader and as major 
spokesman and leader of the Third World.12
Inter-Arab disputes are a feature of the region. Nevertheless, all states will unite around certain causes, 
such as opposition to Israel and all supporters of it. Thus, while wrangling is frequent, serious fighting 
is rare among Arab states. In the current context this is manifested in the unification of Arab military 
forces under nominal Egyptian command.  This can be expected to continue only as long as the 
current crisis continues, however.13
• However heated his rhetoric may become. Nasser is a rational leader well 
aware of the dangers that face him and his hold on power. He will endeavor 
to win as much as he can via non-violent means. We believe he is aware 
of the relative capabilities of his own vis-a-vis Israeli military might.14
Nasser's motives are mixed. On the one hand, he may believe he has already achieved his major aim: 
restoration of the status quo ante 1956 at Aqaba. Now, he is concerned to keep his gains without 
hostilities. On the other hand, however, the blockade is a step the Israelis have said they will not 
tolerate. Nasser would not take such a step without substantial assurances. It is possible that Nasser 
has greater Soviet support than previously believed or that he has been drawn along further than he 
may have wished, or even realized, by his desire to restore his position as regional and Third World 
leader.15
Constraints on Both 
• Unconventional weapons pose a potential threat to both sides. Egypt has used lethal chemical agents 
in Yemen. The Israeli nuclear program maybe sufficiently advanced to provide a militarily useful 
capability, if not a fully developed weapon.   Both sides are well aware.16 
• Maintaining a state of mobilization is expensive for both sides, but more so for the more sophisticated 
and export oriented Israeli economy. We believe they can maintain the current posture for a matter of 
weeks to a few months.17 
Soviet Motives 
• The Soviets are playing a double game: assuring us in private that they 
are urging restraint on Syria and Egypt, while publicly supporting them and 
providing them with arms and advisors. We believe the Soviets do not want 
to see a war and would not wish to see Israel defeated. They are, however, 
strongly committed to their regional allies and have little influence over 
them aside from its arms aid.18
CRITIQUE 
The question now is, which of these propositions is flawed and what improvement to the estimative 
product and/or process is suggested thereby? 
Israeli Propositions 
First, one would have hoped for sufficient insight for someone to have suggested that the often 
reiterated conditional support for Israel would have made it highly likely that the Israelis would frequently 
test the nature and extent of this support. While the 26 May visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister was 
expected to entail entreaties and pressure for the US to provide something, it was never suggested that these 
requests might be instrumental for Israeli policy; that diffidence in supplying support might induce stronger 
Israeli action than they otherwise might have wished to take. Thus, Johnson's often repeated warning to the 
Israelis that they should not initiate hostilities when combined with American unwillingness to engage in any 
coordination beforehand reinforced the Israelis' feelings of isolation as the days passed, especially after the 
closing of the Strait of Aqaba on 22 May. That an outside observer might easily conclude that war was 
virtually inevitable by 29 May is shown by a memo from Walt Rostow to the president saying that "Gene 
Black" (presumably the then-Director of the World Bank) after a briefing by senior staff members had 
concluded that war was certain if the US did nothing, given the impasse between Egyptian and Israeli 
minimal demands.19 This is an example of what I mean by answering the real question even if it is not asked. 
The second proposition with regard to the Israelis was their absolute military superiority. The Israelis 
did not share American optimism. They may have believed they could win a war, but the prospect of a war 
was terrifying. Israeli newspapers were reporting extreme preparations, including the consecration of public 
parks as burial grounds. Fear of chemical weapons, which Egypt was known to have used effectively in 
Yemen, was widespread in Israel. 
The sin here is approaching Israel with American models in mind, and with a lack of sensitivity to 
time. Israel might indeed be superior to the Arabs individually and collectively. The American assumption 
was that Israelis should draw confidence from this rather than a sense of deepening dread. 
A similar mistake was made with respect to Israeli casualties and losses resulting from the armed raids 
by Arab terrorists/freedom fighters. Although hardly more than pin pricks by American standards, they 
were a source of widespread worry. Again it was a matter of the small size and close connection among 
Israeli communities. The names and photographs of victims appeared in the national press bringing the story 
home to the country as a whole. Something Americans could hardly imagine at the time. Since then, 
however, the American hostages held in Iran and Lebanon have shown that even a few victims can twist the 
perceptions and policies of even the greatest of superpowers. 
The one thing we had unambiguously right was that Israel would fight to open Aqaba. Let us hope that 
Rostow's memo to President Johnson was actually read by him. 
The last proposition is the most frustrating to everyone concerned in a crisis. When a crisis is 
recognized, everyone develops a mental picture of what must be going on. Intelligence officers turn those 
imaginings into collection guidance. 'If the Israelis are going to fight for Aqaba, they will have to mobilize. 
Send people out to look for signs of mobilization.' As time goes on and more information is acquired the 
guidance becomes more and more sharply focused until, typically, one or all sides have done everything 
imaginable to prepare for the predicted event. Intelligence then confronts the policy maker's most 
demanding questions. 'I don't want to know what they might do, I want to know what and when.' As it 
happens Johnson's demand was met in the nearest thing to a perfect estimate. During the NSC meeting on 24 
May. Johnson ordered a fresh look at the military balance question. He used the result in this talk with 
Abba Eban two days later. 
To the success of the N1E, Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, attributed his being 
invited to attend Johnson's Tuesday lunches at which senior advisors discussed the major issues of the day, a 
significant boost in his access and stock with Johnson.20 It is still on the short list of things cited to show the IC 
can occasionally get things right. 
The Egyptian Propositions 
Nasser's ambition to regain his standing as undisputed leader of the Arab nations and leading 
spokesman for the Third World were well-known and remarked upon, but were never seen as a prod to 
war. That conclusion was left for the reader to draw. Similarly, the internal divisions among the Arabs 
were the feature highlighted. Their unity in crisis was seen as a response to a perceived crisis and would 
disappear as the crisis cooled. That the Arabs might know this and take it as incentive to maintain and 
escalate the crisis even if it led to war was not articulated. Again, the customer was left to draw their own 
conclusion. 
The third proposition, that Nasser was a rational man and therefore would not engage in a war he 
knew he could not win, again left the real question unaddressed. Was it really irrational to wage wars that 
could not be won? And if it was, had no rational leader ever led his country to a war that could not be won? 
How quickly the organization that was created to prevent future Pearl Harbors forgot the chief lesson of 
Pearl Harbor — that a nation could be placed in a position where a war that could not be won was 
undertaken for a lesser evil than passive submission — that leaders in hopeless positions often overestimate 
their strength or grasp for straws or just plain hope for miracles. Nasser knew he could not win against 
Israel, yet he was hoping that someone, somehow would prevent it coming to that. They had it right in a 
passing remark at the 24 May NSC meeting when the Secretary of the Treasury said that it looked as though 
Nasser were looking for someone to hold him back; to which Rostow retorted that it was more likely he 
was looking for someone to hold Israel back. Yes, and no one took the remark seriously or considered what, if 
anything, might have influenced either side. 
Thus, rather than giving the president the ability to consider the cost of deterring one or the other, a 
cost he might well have decided was too great, the president was left with a simple dichotomy:  maintain at 
least the appearance of American neutrality in the Israel-Arab dispute by pursuing the strategy of creating an 
international naval force to test the Egyptian blockade, or commit the US directly to the Israeli cause and 
alienate all the Arabs, especially the oil producers. 
The Constraints on Both 
The last constraint raises a frequently encountered issue: the question of time. The formulation used 
with reference to Israel was that they could maintain mobilization for some period. Again the 24 May NSC 
meeting was illustrative. General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded to 
Johnson's question about what the US should do after it had relied on the Israelis to take care of themselves. 
Wheeler said that a long war would hurt the Israeli economy. 'At that point' we would have to decide what to 
do. That static view was precisely the sticking point. The Israelis could not wait until after their economy 
had been spent in a long war to then see what the US might do. The Israelis might, have been willing to 
stretch themselves if they had assurances of a US commitment at some point. But lacking such, the Israelis 
could not afford to expend too much of their resources. Their entire military strategy was build around 
minimizing the impact of a war by taking the war to Arab territory and to adopting tactics and strategies 
designed to insure that any war would be a short one. Just as Johnson wanted assurances about what his 
advisors would do if matters turned against the US, the Israelis wanted assurances for the same reason. Not 
getting them induced Israel to initiate war sooner rather than later. Again, the customer was left to draw his 
own conclusion. 
Soviet Motives 
Yet again, the next logical question went unaddressed. Indeed we can see that the USSR was deeply 
committed to its Arab clients, but how committed? Committed enough to directly participate in the war? 
Committed enough to ensure the Arabs a victory? The closest approach to dealing with the issue was US 
Ambassador to Egypt Lucius Battle's comment on 24 May that Nasser might have more Soviet support than 
we knew. The universal opinion was that the Soviets would not risk direct confrontation with the US. That 
remained the opinion until the Soviets actually did intervene directly in early 1970, risking conflict with the 
US and courting confrontation with Israel in the air about the Suez Canal. That crisis broke on 31 July when 
in aerial combat between Soviet and Israeli fighters the Soviets lost five Soviet-manned, first-line aircraft to 
the Israelis" none. A ceasefire was arranged within a week, after months of wrangling. 
What was not considered was the almost entirely instrumental relationship between the USSR and 
Egypt. The Soviets had weapons at prices Egypt could afford. Egypt was willing to go to great lengths to 
obtain weapons. But weapons, once supplied, reset the clock to 'what-have-you-done-for-me-lately'?  
Lacking a real basis, the relationship left the Soviets in danger of being manipulated in 1967 as they were 
in 1970. 
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
What, then, might be suggested by way of improvements to the intelligence product that might open the 
possibility of analysis more responsive to the chief policy maker's needs? 
Stretching the NIE 
Analysts in the IC responsible for producing estimates resist taking responsibility for the correctness of 
their prediction on the grounds that prediction is an inherently error prone activity. Yet the customers expect 
prediction from them. Prediction is the IC's unique contribution based on the unique information available to 
it. Not to predict would be to evade the mandate of the community's customers. The drafters of NIEs know, 
and expect their customers to know, that the uncertainties are very great and that they will often be wrong. 
One can empathize without buying the whole package. Analysts may not know what will happen, but 
they have a fair idea of what the range of possibilities may be. They may not be able to predict a coup, but 
they probably could say who might stage and lead a coup if one were to happen, and given the 'who' they 
could make good guesses about the 'how' and the 'why.' And given all that the collection managers could 
make some shrewd guesses, given the who, how and why, about the 'where' and for 'what' they should be 
alert. This leaves only the 'when' as the great unknown. 
The policy maker may insist on a prediction, but that need not prevent the presentation of alternative 
scenarios and reinterpretations of the evidence. Indeed. I would argue that such a presentation is more likely 
to be what the policy maker would find useful. The problem is how to prevent the development of these 
alternatives from becoming a routine, bureaucratic exercise in itself. I would suggest making them the work 
of individuals rather than the coordination process. These individuals would be held to high standards of 
intellectual honesty and rigor in use of evidence, and there would be some judgment exercised as to how 
many and which alternatives would be presented. One could make the preparation of such an alternative view a 
high honor awarded to the leading analyst espousing the view. It would be both a means of recognizing 
outstanding ability and exposing a maturing analyst to the challenge of writing for his most demanding 
audience. 
Substance is important in these alternative views. They would not be merely arguments in favor of 
one or another position. They would be required to identify and relate events for which intelligence 
collectors could watch and whose occurrence would indicate to policy makers how the trend of events was 
altering the estimated likelihoods of the alternatives presented in the NIE.21
Verifying that the change proposed here had the desired improving effect would require a consistent 
program of post-mortems. The post mortem is an honorable, if problematic, tradition in the intelligence 
business. Usually associated with compromises of classified data or operations to determine causes and the 
extent of damage, post-mortems are also occasionally conducted to determine why an analytical judgment 
turned out poorly.22 The purpose of the proposed postmortems would not be to fix responsibility for error, but 
to determine the extent to which an NIE had reflected all the major influences affecting the outcome. It can 
be argued that the writers of NIEs already do that in their footnotes and alternative opinions.23 True, but 
what the IC could do that might be more informative and helpful, even for themselves, would be to first, 
make the dimensions of the disagreement clear by stating the competing positions in comparable terms. 
Most important would be to make clear the relative impacts of each alternative. For example, in the 
1988 NIE 11-3/8 Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict there was a dissent from the consensus 
by the Army and the State Department with respect to anticipated Soviet air defenses. Essentially the Army 
assessed the improvement would be less than the consensus and the State Department assessed that the 
improvement, whatever it might be, would not affect the strategic relationship. But the implications of these 
dissents were not addressed. 
Even granting that these sentences summarized a complex argument, it would take only a few more 
sentences to summarize the impact of the disagreement. This is the kind of clarity non-technical and higher-
level decision makers need in order to be able to understand arguments made in the NIEs. As the highest-
level policy-relevant intelligence documents that have had and will have resource allocation implications, 
such clarity is indispensable. The ability to verify that such clarity is being introduced, maintained and 
expanded is no less so. 
Deal fully with the implications of the analysis and the question 
This is an extension of the previous argument. Drafters should walk a fine line between merely 
responding to the question asked and inflicting their own opinions on the harried consumer. Not only should 
disagreements among the IC members be made apparent, but the NIE should anticipate the consumer by 
addressing the anticipatable implications of its own analysis and the consumer's concerns expressed by the 
request for the estimate. 
The major innovation advocated here is to give NIE drafters opportunity, means and motive to go 
beyond the confines of a series of questions or terms of reference to deal with the full implications of their 
work. The style of estimate advocated above provides them with their opportunity. The motivation would 
come from assigning individuals who strongly advocate alternative positions to write these sections. The 
means must be an intellectually responsible piece of work; not a coordinated one, but one that respects the 
evidence and the honesty of the IC coordinated view. I do not believe this would result in scattershot 
estimates. I do believe that individual responsibility will enhance the sharpness of the views expressed and 
better expose alternative risks and consequences for the benefit of policy makers. 
Tighten production of the schedule 
The more time available, the more editorial polishing will be done, leading to rounded edges and 
finessed compromises. The 1967 SNIE that has so impressed later writers had the advantage of having to be 
written in less than a day. Shortened time would not lead to ill-considered estimates. The substance of most 
estimates is under active consideration all the time. And we sometimes forget that crisis responses are 
always time-stressed. It is a question of determining what style of response is appropriate to a particular 
NIE. A regularly scheduled NIE on a topic characterized by consensus or one characterized by great 
technical unknowns may tempt the sin of over-coordination if allowed too much time. I would argue for 
short deadlines even in such cases. 
Sensitization/Education 
If a common effect of crisis is to narrow the receptivity' of policy makers to the full range of relevant 
information and if the primary mission of intelligence is to provide such information to policy makers, 
especially in crisis, then it is incumbent on intelligence producers both to resist the effects of crisis on 
themselves and to try to assure that its input to policy makers gets through to them with all its nuances and 
complexity. In short, intelligence must try to hold open the door to the policy maker's mind.   How to do 
that? 
Analysts and policy makers alike might be educated to recognize when their own work began to exhibit 
the narrowing focus that typically results from the stress of crisis situations. A self-analysis would help 
intelligence producers meet one of their major responsibilities — to maintain flexibility and nuance of 
expression in their products during crisis situations. This would aid senior policymakers by insuring they 
were presented with challenging input. As a principle means of situation tracking for senior policy makers, 
such intelligence support would help them to resist the effects of stressful circumstances. 
The problem for senior officials, especially at changes in administration, is lack of direct experience 
with intelligence, leaving them at the mercy of whatever novels or press reports they might have read. It is 
too true that expectations of exotic collection systems are often grossly out of line with reality. Even worse 
may be notions about the effectiveness and desirability of significant intelligence capabilities based on 
misapprehensions culled from various open media, which is not to say that a critical attitude toward 
intelligence organization. mission and methods is not justified. At least some of Admiral Stansfield Turner's 
early difficulties stemmed from such attitudes. 
Without specifying modalities, what is needed is an academy for newly elected and appointed policy 
makers. The major purpose of a Leaders' Intelligence Academy is to bring home to senior elected and 
appointed officials their fiduciary responsibility to their intelligence support. Intelligence support is not a 
free good. Their demands for information drive the system. Given the high priority accorded them, their 
requests could become disruptive. Senior officials, therefore, need to acquire knowledge about the methods 
and practices of intelligence collection and analysis so that they can form effective expectations of 
intelligence. They must understand their own central role in providing feedback and direction to the 
intelligence process. It is imperative that senior leaders acknowledge that they have a deep responsibility 
toward their intelligence support. 
In addition to information about systems and their capabilities, and organizations, the president-elect is 
given options on how to receive intelligence. Is he also informed of his role as the most powerful 
requirements driver and what effect this can have on the IC? Is he informed about the characteristics of the 
various ‘INTs’ that can affect or even bias reporting from them? Is he given a map of the political minefield 
he is about to enter — old wounds still sensitive, current issues and positions — so that he does not enter 
the White House with faulty expectations about intelligence? 
A cognitive-psychological mechanism 
Finally, a mechanism is needed with which the openness to information of both intelligence producers 
and intelligence consumers can be analyzed and tracked, and both communities can be made self-aware to 
support an effort to resist the tunnel vision that afflicts small group decision-making under stress. One 
technique for doing so grows out of the concept of integrative cognitive complexity. This approach holds that 
to the extent decision-making depends upon the search for and recognition of relevant knowledge, the speech 
and writings of those responsible will reflect their state of mind. This proposition has been tested on 
speeches at the UN on Middle East problems between 1947 and 1976. Findings indicated that the level of 
complexity displayed by Arab and Israeli speakers varied from relatively complex during periods of low 
hostility to low complexity during times of rising hostility, hitting a low point just before hostilities broke 
out. The level of complexity of the US and USSR varied with the fortunes of their respective allies in the 
region, although they never reached the low levels of complexity of the Arabs and Israelis. Essentially, this 
study made the case that there was order and predictability in the complexity levels of speech and writings 
of diplomats in peace and crisis. Moreover, the variations were similar despite language and cultural 
differences. The authors suggested the possibility of teaching participants to recognize such changes in 
their performance.24
A recent study shows that before, during and after the Gulf War the content of George Bush's and 
Saddam Hussein's speech showed the contrary patterns. Bush's pattern went from moderately complex to 
very simple just before the combat phase of the war, and back to more complex levels shortly after the 
beginning of combat. The pattern of Saddam Hussein's speech showed the reverse pattern, peaking just 
before combat. These changes were closely associated with the perceived changes in the fortunes of the two 
sides over the course of the conflict. Changes in the integrative complexity of Hussein's speech was a good 
early indicator of his intent to attack Kuwait. However, the study also showed that the level of complexity in 
Bush's speech was lower than the content of some leaders who were less directly involved, e.g., Mitterand 
and Mubarak.25
There are advantages to pursuing this line of inquiry. The greatest is that this technique measures 
directly one of the worst effects of crisis-related stress: the focusing of attention evidenced by the narrowing 
of openness to relevant information and alternative problem solutions. This may be the most important 
substantive role of intelligence on behalf of senior policy makers. 
I believe that a study of intelligence produced for the use of senior officials before, during and after 
crises compared to the leadership's spoken and written communication over the same period would be 
worthwhile. The object would be to determine what the relationship between the two may have been. Three 
hypotheses are posed. First, the complexity scores of the intelligence product will prove to be consistently 
higher than those of the leadership because the intelligence mission is to present the most accurate possible 
picture of reality in all its variability, while policy makers function to reduce complexity in order to reach 
decision. Second, if the complexity scores of the intelligence product and the leadership's communication 
varied in a similar manner three conditions are possible. If changes in the complexity scores of the IC 
precede those of the leadership it suggests the leadership is responding to the intelligence received. If the 
complexity scores vary together, it may be that non-intelligence sources of information available to policy 
makers were as influential as the intelligence output; or, alternatively, due to the crisis, the relationship 
between intelligence and leader had become extremely close because there was no alternative. If the 
complexity scores of intelligence lag behind those of the leadership, it would suggest that intelligence 
needed to assess its presentation to policy makers. Finally, a random divergence between the scores of the 
two would suggest that a problem exists and that training, sensitization and familiarization would be 
worthwhile for both intelligence and policy makers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The chief flaw in NIEs identified was that they did not present complete, rounded analyses. They 
presented one or a few alternatives and did not address the full implications of them. Too often the readers 
were left to form their own conclusion.   The picture of President Johnson on 24 May is haunting. 
This is not to say that the contribution of intelligence is trivial. Clearly, the most important 
contribution of the US intelligence community to foreign policy in the pre-1967 war crisis was the 
conclusion that Israel was militarily superior to any combination of Arab enemies. Nearly all the rest was 
situation tracking and had no real impact on the formation of policy. American policy was proceeding on 
traditional lines — preserve relations with conservative Arabs, especially oil producers, for strategic 
reasons; maintain Israel's existence for a complex set of ideological and domestic political reasons; and 
keep the Soviets out of. or at least minimize their presence in. the Mediterranean and Middle East. Nothing 
intelligence supplied altered any of this. 
Improvement in the product may come from improvements in collection of information. New 
techniques, sources and methods of analysis are always to be sought. But intelligence is most dependent on 
its analysts. The best data inadequately exploited is not worth much. The drafters of products like NIEs 
have to be given the challenge and opportunity to put a complete picture before the policy maker. 
Presenting one's best guess as to the most likely eventuality should not prevent strong arguments being 
made for plausible alternatives. 
The measure of merit for NIEs should be not the accuracy of their predictions but whether they 
conveyed a well argued case that included consideration of all the factors which, in the light of hindsight, 
can be seen to have been influential on the outcome. 
Difficulties, however, lie in two directions. First, how to insure that strong, sharp arguments are made. I 
suggest empowering working analysts of proven ability to write their alternatives as individuals, subject only 
to the rules of honest debate and logical reasoning. Counterposing such alternatives to the coordinated view 
may spur both sides to consider the full implications of judgments and may better catch the interest of 
readers. 
In the other direction, there is a need for better training and preparation of both analysts and policy 
makers to resist the effects of crisis-related stress, e.g., narrowing of the search for new information and too 
rapid convergence on immediately available 'solutions.' I have suggested a cognitive psychological technique 
aimed at analyzing the content of both the intelligence presented to top policy makers and the 
communications of such policy makers for its cognitive complexity. The technique has the advantages of 
relevancy, directness and simplicity. Senior personnel on both sides may, with some education, be able to 
maintain a self awareness such that if any future president at a future NSC meeting says. 'What do we do if 
our preferred option fails?,' it will be a thunderclap mandating a response, not the repetitions that Johnson 
got. 
Finally, I have suggested a leadership academy, with a tutorial of a few days duration, intended to supply 
newly elected/appointed policy makers with a basic understanding of what intelligence is, how it can be made 
to serve them and what their role and responsibilities are in making it work. The details of how it would work 
are not as important as recognizing that the end of the Cold War, with its comfortable budgets and paradigms, 
has put renewed emphasis on the necessity for responsive, informative intelligence. Not a mere 
reorientation or expansion of the apparatus in being, but a rethinking of what we expect of intelligence in a 
future which is certain to be unfamiliar and challenging. 
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